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ABSTRACT

In his book, "Illiberal Education," Dinesh D'Souza dramatizes the transformation of American campuses and the academic revolution that is allegedly toppling traditional notions of Western civilization. However, many scholars are concerned that D'Souza'a collection of examples might leave readers with a false impression of the severity of problems on campuses, and an analysis of D'Souza's argument reveals that these concerns are not unwarranted. The primary method of his argument is extensive use of anecdote. The theory of anecdotal evidence is grounded in the discussion of the inductive generalization or arguments from example, and many writers on the subject maintain that although the use of examples to illustrate or support a point may be quite persuasive, arguments relying on this type of reasoning may not be cogent. Overuse of examples may lead to hasty generalizations, and despite D'Souza's elaborate claims for his work, his book does not illustrate what is real but instead seeks to create a reality. When the book is examined as an argument from example, it fails the cogency test and is not logically convincing, but does prove to be persuasive discourse, as reviews of the book have attested. In supporting his primary claim that there is indeed an academic revolution underway, D'Souza presents three "facts": changes in admissions policies in favor of minorities; the evaporation of core curricula; and the promotion of diversity and pluralism. Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence as offered fails to support these reasons. Further, D'Souza treats his claims as established facts that are widely accepted, which they are not. (Eighteen references are attached.) (HB)

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Anecdotia Ad Nauseam: An Argument Analysis of D'Souza's Illiberal Education

by

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> Let's just face it. The men in our society cannot control themselves. . . Women will start fighting back. Women will begin to react with as much violence as men have mustered against them. Women will begin to stop talking about castration, and make it a reality. Women will begin to abandon their life-giving, caring inner nature and start carrying guns. Women will begin to kill men if they have to. (D'Souza, 1991, p. 11)

Dinesh D'Souza uses this example and many others like it dramatize the transformation of American campuses and the academic revolution that is allegedly toppling traditional notions of Western civilization. According to D'Souza, "The distinctive insignia of this revolution can be witnessed on any major campus in America today, and in all major aspects of university life" (p. 2). This book, which seeks to interpret for the masses how college campuses are dealing with diversity issues, has brought the cultural diversity debate out of the classroom and into the living rooms of the American public. However, many scholars are concerned that D'Souza's collection of dramatic and somewhat extreme examples might leave readers with a false impression about the type and severity of problems on college campuses.

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An analysis of D'Souza's arguments reveals that these concerns are not unwarranted. Although D'Souza uses a variety of rhetorical and argumentative strategies to make his point, this paper will focus on his primary method of argument, which is argument from example, or more specifically, argument from anecdote. This paper will construct a theory of anecdotal evidence, which will be based on Perelman's and Whately's explanations of example and illustration, descriptions of generalizations and anecdotal evidence, and discussions of cogent versus persuasive arguments. The paper will then use this theory to analyze and evaluate D'Souza's primary argumentative strategies.

Theory of Anecdotal Evidence

The theory of anecdotal evidence is grounded in the discussion of the inductive generalization or argument from example. Generalizations or arguments from example rely on examples, instances or experiences to prove the truth of a particular conclusion. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1969) "Argumentation by example--by the very fact that one has resorted to it--implies disagreement over the particular rule the example is invoked to establish, but assumes earlier agreement on the possibility of arriving at a generalization from particular cases or, at the very least, on the effects of inertia" (p. 350).

Many authors of recently-published argumentation and critical thinking texts define "example" in a manner similar to that of Sproule (1980), who describes an example as an

"individual case" or "something that happened at a particular time and place" (p. 103). Sproule asserts that "synonyms for 'example' include 'instance,' 'anecdote,' and 'illustration'" (p. 103). Despite the common practice of using the terms "example" and "illustration" interchangeably, Perelman argues that there is a subtle, yet important, difference between the two terms. This difference will become quite relevant in the discussion of D'Souza's use of anecdotal evidence to advance his thesis. According to Perelman, although arguments by illustrations and examples attempt to establish reality, examples serve to establish a rule or generalization, whereas illustrations serve to demonstrate an established rule or generalization. In order to prove the rule, examples must be accepted as fact by the audience but illustrations need not be. Perelman explains that:

> Whereas an example is designed to establish a rule, the role of illustration is to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement, show the import of this statement by calling attention to its various possible applications, and increase its presence to the consciousness. (p. 357)

Presence" refers to importance or salience. According to Perelman, the simplest way to create presence is by repetition. "Accumulating stories, even contradictory ones, on a given subject may create the impression that it is an important one" (p. 144). Another defining feature of the illustration is that "it should strike the imagination forcibly so as to win

attention" (p. 357). The illustration serves to corroborate rather than to establish the rule, and according to Perelman,"illustrations are undoubtedly often chosen for their affective impact" (p. 360).

Whately also suggests that there is a subtle distinction between example and illustration when he explains that examples are often presented for the purpose of illustration rather than argument. An example used as illustration seeks to clarify the claim rather than to prove it (Golden & Corbett, 1968). Whately indicates that if instances of illustration were presented to establish a rule rather than to demonstrate it, then the speaker would have engaged in question begging by assuming that the rule had already been established or accepted as general principle. Recognizing the use of instances as example versus illustration is necessary to understand D'Souza's argumentative techniques.

Sproule's notion of examples as persuasive entities is consistent with Perelman's beliefs about the role of illustration in argument. Sproule indicates that specific, concrete examples are very persuasive and that personal anecdotes or stories are particularly powerful. Andrews (1990) concurs with Sproule's notion that examples may exert a strong persuasive force, and he argues that "examples help make vivid and real generalizations that might otherwise be abstract; thus they promote audience identification" (p. 51).

Although it is well-established that using examples or illustrations to support or demonstrate a point may be quite

persuasive, arguments which rely this type of reasoning may not be cogent. Many critical thinking and argumentation texts elaborate on the difference between persuasive and logical arguments, and they remind readers that understanding this difference is essential when critiquing argumentative discourse. Freeman (1988) distinguishes between an argument's persuasive force and its logically convincing character. According to Freeman, a persuasive argument is able to bring people to accept its conclusion, while a logically convincing argument contains true premises which are relevant and adequately support the conclusion.

Govier's (1992) discussion of cogency is similar to Freeman's description of logically convincing arguments. Govier argues that cogent arguments must include acceptable premises which are properly connected to the conclusion. Acceptable premises are those which are reasonably believable; premises which are properly connected to the conclusion are relevant to the conclusion and provide sufficient grounds for the conclusion. According to Govier, it is important when criticizing arguments to require the reasons to be relevant and to provide sufficient or good grounds for the conclusion. Often, generalizations may include acceptable, relevant reasons or examples, but these reasons or examples may be atypical or too few in number to provide sufficient grounds for the conclusion. Thus, according to Govier, generalizations lacking sufficient grounds do not meet the conditions for cogency and are therefore hasty. Sproule uses similar criteria when attempting to assess the strength of a

generalization. He states that although the examples may correspond or be relevant to the conclusion, it is essential that the critic determine whether the examples are typical and predominant.

Many critical thinking and argumentation texts discuss the hasty generalization fallacy, and a few texts recognize the anecdotal argument as a special type of generalization. Govier states that evidence is "purely anecdotal" when "it is based on anecdotes, or stories of what happened to a person, as opposed to any systematic effort to obtain a representative sample from the population that the generalization is about" (p. 345). Moore and Parker (1992) offer a similar description of anecdotal evidence; however, they also imply that arguers using this type of evidence reveal an intent to deceive their audience. According to these authors, "The fallacy of hasty generalization has a subspecies that occurs when someone ignores data that offer reasonable support for a conclusion and instead puts faith in an example or two that run against that conclusion. This is commonly known as the fallacy of anecdotal evidence" (p. 331).

Based on these discussions of arguments from examples, illustrations, and anecdotes, I will, for the purposes of this analysis, define anecdotal evidence as dramatic, interesting stories or personal experiences which are used to support a claim. Anecdotal arguments invite the audience to believe that the stories or personal experiences represent a reality, which is created by the arguer.

Illiberal Education: An Exercise in Public Argument

D'Souza asserts that his book "dramatizes the transformation in academia," and that he seeks "to give the reader an inside look into how the controversial claims of the new politics of race and sex assert themselves in all areas of campus life, and are debated and adjudicated within the governing framework of the university" (p. 20). However, this paper will argue that D'Souza's book does not illustrate what is real but seeks to create a reality. In other words, although D'Souza approaches his discussion of the politicization of the academy from the perspective of one who merely seeks to demonstrate and make concrete what has already been accepted a fact, he actually uses stories and examples to prove a particular claim. Thus, the D'Souza book is really an exercise in public argument, and should be scrutinized as such. When the D'Souza book is examined as an argument from example, it fails the cogency test and is not logically convincing.

Before evaluating the book as a logically-convincing piece of discourse, it helps to understand its persuasive dimension. Often arguments that rely on examples are more persuasive than they are logically convincing. Andrews contends that, "Examples that are specific and real may serve to demonstrate that actual cases do exist; yet, unless their typicality can also be demonstrated or is accepted, their psychological power is generally more formidable than their logical power" (p. 51). The book's persuasive force is derived from the illusion D'Souza creates that there exists a great number of specific, dramatic

cases to demonstrate the problems with higher education. As stated earlier in the paper, specific details have a greater impact than general or abstract notions. According to Sproule, "personal examples may have a particularly impressive effect" (p. 106). Not only do these examples more dramatically illustrate what is "real," but D'Souza's reports of personal conversations he had with various students, faculty, and administrators serve to enhance his credibility, since this allegedly demonstrates his direct and first-hand knowledge of the problem.

An analysis of several reviews of D'Souza's Illiberal Education indicates that the book does indeed exert a persuasive force. In a July 1991 review in The New York Review of Books, C. Vann Woodward, who essentially agrees with D'Souza's thesis, recognizes the book's persuasive effect when he states:

> As for accuracy of reporting and reliability of judgment, it would be wise to bear in mind that Illiberal Education is a polemical work written with strong conviction to condemn and to persuade, and that it is largely a collection of negative examples. Its moderation in tone and style may put readers off guard for its occasional stretching of evidence and logic to score a point. That does occur, but on the whole, for a subject so heatedly debated up to the last moment, the investigation seems reasonably thorough, the rhetoric comparatively temperate, and the documentation fairly detailed, if sometimes very selective. (p. 32)

Despite Woodward's acknowledgement that readers may not recognize the book's "occasional stretching of evidence and logic to score

a point," the fact that he perceives the investigation to be "reasonably thorough" and the "documentation fairly detailed" indicates that he may have been taken in by D'Souza as well.

Conservative audiences may have found the book particularly persuasive. Joseph Adelson, a University of Michigan psychology professor, states in a June 1991 review in Commentary that:

> This is a painful book to read for anyone with a strong sense of what the university ought to be. Other reviews have termed what it reveals "chilling," "sickening," "disturbing," to which one can add, depressing, infuriating, appalling, disgusting, or any other adjective denoting intense negative emotion. Why is it so upsetting? Because of the sheer accumulation of detail, incident after incident, at institutions large and small, pedestrian and distinguished, each example depicting outrageous behavior--the arrogance and disingenuousness of the Left, the cravenness, confusion and stupidity of administrators, the passivity and self-absorption of the faculty. As you read these accounts, there is a moment when you recognize, suddenly, that things are really much worse than you thought. And that recognition is followed by still another, that matters are even worse than that, since there are so many incidents no one knows about, because they are too local or too commonplace. (p. 55)

Obviously those who share D'Souza's sentiments are likely to interpret his anecdotes as illustrations of what has already been established: that "the current revolution of minority victims

threatens to destroy the highest ideals of liberal education . . . . " (D'Souza, 1991, p. 257). For this audience, D'Souza's points serve to demonstrate and clarify what they already knew or accepted as fact, rather than to prove a not-yet-established point. For Adelson, in particular, D'Souza's book does not seek to prove that a problem with higher education exists, but rather it illustrates the scope and significance of the problem. Adelson notes that the problem may be even more serious that it appears, since D'Souza could not have possibly found every single case demonstrating the problems with higher education.

These reviews suggest that for audiences who already agree with the book's thesis, D'Souza's stories serve to reinforce and illustrate his thesis. For audiences who disagree with D'Souza's thesis, this book is most likely to be perceived as one which relies on biased, non-representative examples in order to mislead audiences into believing that campuses are run by intolerant Leftists who advance their political agendas while sacrificing educational quality. Several reviewers of D'Souza's book seem to share this perception and recognize D'Souza's attempt at using anecdotal evidence to prove his claims.

In a book review appearing in a May 1991 issue of The New Yorker, Louis Menand argues that, "D'Souza is principally out to find the nonsense, and the people he meets on campuses around the country (or, at least, those he chooses to quote) are generally obliging" (p. 102). According to Menand, "It will be apparent to most people who read 'Illiberal Education' that the book's

promise of balance is a false one. For D'Souza is as committed to having his facts support his convictions as are any of the academic politicians he inveighs against" (p. 107). He also accuses D'Souza of making every case demonstrate the same claim. Nancy S. Dye makes similar indictments in her review, which appeared in a March 1991 issue of the New York Times Book Review. Dye argues that, "What we read in 'Illiberal Education' is seriously misleading. Mr. D'Souza has constructed his argument by cobbling together anecdotal accounts of campus incidents, clippings from the Chronicle of Higher Education and highly selective statements from students, admissions officers, deans and faculty members" (p. 12).

Occasionally, a conservative critic might recognize possible biases in D'Souza's book. In a more favorable review appearing in an April 1991 issue of The New Republic, Eugene D. Genovese of the University Center in Georgia even admits that "occasionally D'Souza descends into biased and irritating attacks on the left and center, with sweeping and one-sided characterizations of Marxism and Marxists, liberalism and liberals" (p. 35). However, Genovese tempers this criticism with the following remark: "Yet on the whole he makes a good effort to be fair, to focus on issues, to avoid ad hominem attacks, and to check his own political passions" (p. 35). Despite Genovese's admission that D'Souza may reveal some bias in his discussion of liberals, he indicates that overall D'Souza tries to be fair.

So far, this section has discussed how one particular audience might perceive D'Souza's book as an illustration of what

they have already accepted as fact, while another audience would interpret the book as an attempt to prove particular claims by using examples. The following section will argue that for a "universal audience," which is composed of all rational and reasonable persons, D'Souza's primary method of support is actually a collection of examples or anecdotes that attempt to gain audience acceptance of a claim, as opposed to D'Souza's assertion that this book attempts to "give the reader an inside look into how the controversial claims of the new politics of race and sex assert themselves in all areas of campus life . . . ." (p. 20). Despite the fact that D'Souza would have us believe that his book is an argument from illustration, or more specifically, a dramatization of the transformation in academia, when one bases his or her analysis on the writings of Perelman and Whately, he or she would recognize that this book is an argument from example, or more precisely, an argument from anecdote. This distinction is important, because if one analyzes the book's primary argument based on what D'Souza <u>suggests</u> it is--an illustration of what has been established as fact, then the book begs some big questions. If one analyzes the book's thesis for what it <u>really</u> is--an argument from example or anecdote, then it fails to meet the standards for argument cogency.

D'Souza's thesis or primary claim is that an academic revolution, unchecked by administrators or the public, is underway on American campuses. This revolution is characterized by unfair and preferential admission policies, the abandonment of

the classics in favor of overtly ideological scholarship, and censorship of ideas which are contrary to the political ideals of campus liberals.

D'Souza presents three "facts," which serve as his primary premises to support the claim that there is indeed an academic revolution on college campuses. It is only in this first chapter that D'Souza recognizes that not all individuals reading this book might already know these facts. Since he provides a few examples to support each claim, this might indicate that he understands their function, which are to prove rather than to illustrate or dramatize. D'Souza also states that, "As these examples suggest, an academic and cultural revolution is under way at American universities" (p. 13). This suggests that he believes he has provided enough data to establish his thesis and the corresponding premises, and later in the chapter he indicates that the rest of the book illustrates and dramatizes "the transformation in academia."

D'Souza presents the following facts on which the rest of the book is based.

Fact #1:

> Virtually all American universities have changed their admissions rules so that they now fill a sizable portion of their freshman class each year with students from certified minority groups--mainly blacks and Hispanics--who have considerably lower grade point averages and standardized test scores than white and Asian American applicants who are refused admission. (p.2)

Fact #2:

> Most American universities have diluted or displaced their "core curriculum" in the great works of Western civilization to make room for new course requirements stressing non-Western cultures, Afro-American Studies, and Women's Studies. Since race and gender issues are so sensitive, the university leadership often discourages faculty from presenting factual material that may provoke or irritate minority students. (p. 5)

Fact #3:

> Most universities seek to promote "pluralism" and "diversity" on campus by setting up and funding separate institutions for minority groups . . . . Universities also seek to protect minority sensitivities by imposing administrative sanctions, ranging from forced apologies to expulsion, for remarks that criticize individuals or policies based on race, gender, and sexual orientation stereotypes. Since blacks, feminists, and homosexuals are regarded as oppressed victims, they are usually exempt from these restrictions and permitted considerable license in their conduct. (p. 8)

In the following chapters, D'Souza dramatizes this revolution by examining episodes at six universities: Berkeley, Stanford, Howard, Michigan, Duke, and Harvard. His stated reason for selecting these particular universities was that, "these colleges are leaders in the academy whose policies smaller schools often emulate" (p. 20). He also reminds the reader that

he supplies additional examples to show that the phenomena are "widely experienced on other campuses" (p. 20). Nowhere in his book does D'Souza prove that other "smaller" colleges have followed or will follow the lead of these six universities. Since it is not an established fact that an academic revolution is underway, and since the universal audience has most likely not accepted his three primary premises as facts, D'Souza's book must be examined as an argument from example or anecdote. If we examine the book from this perspective, we find that D'Souza's argument fails to meet the third condition of the cogency test, which is sufficient grounds. D'Souza's primary mode of support for his first claim, that admissions policies unfairly favor minorities, is a collection of stories from some disenchanted Berkeley and Michigan students as well as statements from Berkeley admissions officers and prep school counselors. He also presents some admissions and retention data from Berkeley's undergraduate university and law school as information about the SAT.

D'Souza tries to illustrate the problem with affirmative action and preferential admissions policies with the following:

> The practical result of affirmative action is well illustrated by a typical case cited by Donald Werner, the headmaster of Westminster Prep School in New Haven, Connecticut. "The University of California at Berkeley made decisions on two of our students, both Californians. Student A was ranked in the top third of his class, student B in the bottom third. Student A had college board scores

totaling 1,290; student B's scores totaled 890. Student A had a record of good citizenship; student B was expelled this winter for breaking a series of major school rules. Student A was white; student B was black. Berkeley refused student A and accepted student B." (p. 41-42)

D'Souza's indicts the transformation of the curriculum and the dangerous shift to au courant scholarship at American universities by presenting a myriad of stories from students, faculty, and administrators at Stanford, Howard, Duke, and Harvard. He culls from catalogs descriptions of a few Women's and Ethnic Studies courses to reveal the absurdity of such programs. D'Souza also shares the stories of some disgruntled students and faculty members who disagree with tenets of feminism and Marxism and who fear Afrocentrism.

D'Souza reveals several instances of where the classics are supposedly taking a back seat to the texts which reflect the "new minority agenda." He states, "Perhaps Christopher Clausen, chairman of the English department at Penn State University, reflected the emerging consensus when he remarked, 'I would bet that Alice Walker's The Color Purple is taught in more English departments today than all of Shakespeare's plays combined.'" (p. 68). Concerned with the Afrocentric focus at some universities as well as the "distortion" of history, D'Souza gives some examples of courses offered at Howard University's and raises questions about a controversial work by Cornell professor Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. D'Souza points out that:

"The political purpose of Black Athena," the author announces at the outset, "is to lessen European cultural arrogance." Bernal goes on to argue that Egyptian civilization was "fundamentally African . . . . I am convinced that many of the most powerful Egyptian dynasties . . . were made up of pharaohs whom one can usefully call black." (p. 116)

D'Souza also levies attacks against Women's Studies curricula and shares this personal experience to give the reader an idea of a "typical" Women's Studies class:

> The distinctive perspective of the field is typified by Harvard Women's Studies professor Alice Jardine's class on "French Literary Criticism," whose November 22, 1989, session is fairly representative of numerous Women's Studies classes I attended, at Harvard and elsewhere.
>
> The atmosphere in Jardine's course resembled a political rally. The seminar group was almost entirely female: twenty-five women versus three men. Headbands and turquoise jewelry, loose long shirts, and pins advertising various causes filled the room . . . . A student went to the board and put up a poster of a "Fifty Foot Woman"; everybody smiled at this emblem of female power. (p. 208)

D'Souza also offers accounts of faculty and student reactions to gender and race oriented curricula. He presents Princeton faculty member Robert Hollander's feelings about the Women's Studies program introduced in the early 1980s:

> When the motion to establish Women's Studies passed, Hollander remembers, "Women were embracing and kissing on the floor. This struck me as odd. Was this an academic discussion or a political rally? Were we discussing ideas or feelings? It confirmed what I had feared about the program." (p. 6)

The book includes a statement from another Princeton professor, and in order to demonstrate the typicality of a racial distortion case at Stanford, D'Souza states:

> This cultural distortion is routine in multicultural and Third World studies--the case of Stanford is typical. Bernard Lewis, professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton, describes what he calls "a new culture of deceit on the campus," and adds, "It is very dangerous to give in to these ideas, or more accurately, to these pressures. It makes a mockery of scholarship to say: my nonsense is as good as your science." But even university officials who agree with Lewis say they aren't sure what they can do to counter these distortions, since the ideological forces behind them are so strong. (p. 249)

In addition to sharing anecdotes which dramatize the problems with race and gender awareness on campuses, D'Souza reminds the reader that many women and members of different ethnic backgrounds are concerned about the unnecessary focus on these issues. He also includes reactions to the preferential hiring policies adopted to attract more female and ethnic candidates. D'Souza states:

> In fact, some black professors believe that the faculty handouts and quotas of Duke and other colleges ultimately work to the detriment of minority intellectual advancement in the academy. Kenny Williams, a black female English professor at Duke, remarked that she frequently suffers from assumptions that she was hired and promoted solely on the basis of race and gender. "I want to be accepted on the basis of merit," she said, addition that she dissociated herself from "the race-gender-class group." (p. 187)

Finally, his proof that censorship is rampant on college campus includes excerpts from "hate speech" policies adopted on various campuses, including the Universities of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; and anecdotes shared by those who were reprimanded for their involvement in racist, sexist, or homophobic incidents on campus. Several faculty have come under fire for making allegedly racist and sexist comments, and some students at the University of Connecticut, Evergreen State College and the University of South Carolina were reprimanded for harassing women, homosexuals, and African Americans. D'Souza shares this and several similar stories:

> In the fall of 1989, Nina Wu, a junior at the University of Connecticut, put up what she considered to be a humorous poster on her dormitory door. Among the categories of people who were "unwelcome" in her room, the poster allegedly listed "bimbos," "preppies," "racists," and "homos." She was brought up on charges by the administration and found guilty of using the word "homos" in

violation of a policy which prohibits "making slurs or epithets based on race, sex, ethnic origin, religion or sexual orientation." She was expelled from her dormitory and the dining hall, and restored her privileges only when she filed suit in federal district court in Hartford. (p. 145)

It is not this paper's intent to question the truth of these examples or to offer counter examples, rather this paper argues that these examples are purely anecdotal and do not support D'Souza's claims. D'Souza's cases fulfill Govier's notion of anecdotal evidence, in that his examples are essentially stories of what happened to individuals who do not likely to represent the population. Govier also states that evidence is anecdotal when the arguer has not made a systematic effort to obtain a representative sample of the population. As mentioned earlier in this paper, some reviewers suggest that D'Souza carefully selected his examples in order to support his thesis. Menand states:

> D'Souza would have had better luck persuading us . . . had he found a single example of a curriculum that has become more enlightening, or a field of study whose scope has been broadened, or a student whose life has been made better because of the changes that have occurred in higher education since 1960. But he makes every case illustrate the same claim--that the social transformation of the American college has been a failure. (p. 107)

Dye also suggests that D'Souza may have overlooked some important data. She states that, ". . . Mr. D'Souza's discourse is framed entirely in polarities. There are only extremes here. . . . In point of fact, there is a vast middle ground on American campuses, albeit one that too often goes unnoticed. Mr. D'Souza simply has not looked for it" (p. 12). Even a reviewer who is sympathetic to D'Souza's position indicates that he may have ignored examples that suggest something contrary to the book's claims about race and gender studies on campus. Genovese (1991) states that "D'Souza simply ignores the record of the best of those programs in enriching the college curriculum" (p. 33).

Although D'Souza gives the appearance of an extensive research effort and continually reminds the reader that the incidents are typical, representative, and widespread, other data suggest that the examples are not representative of the general population of college campuses. There are over 1800 four-year universities in America, yet D'Souza presents examples from primarily six institutions and includes anecdotes from several other universities. His data were collected from the individuals to whom he and his assistants spoke, as well as from newspaper accounts of problems on college campuses. Obviously the media will cover noteworthy incidents rather than printing stories which say that all is quiet and well on American campuses. According to an American Council on Education survey of nearly 360 public and private institutions, only three percent of these institutions said they experienced battles on campus over textbooks or information presented in the classroom (The

Chronicle of Higher Education, 1991). Elaine El-Khawas, who conducted the survey, said that "Reports of widespread efforts to impose politically correct thinking on college students and faculty appear to be overblown" (p. A23).

Therefore, when approaching this book as an argument from example, we find that although it is persuasive to some, it is not logically convincing to a universal audience and does not meet all of the conditions of cogency. On the other hand, if we approach this book as an argument from illustration, then we discover that D'Souza engages in gross question-begging. As explained earlier in the paper, Perelman states that examples are designed to establish a rule, whereas illustrations strengthen adherence to an already-established or accepted rule. Perelman explains that not all cases function in the same manner and "the passage from example to illustration often occurs almost imperceptibly, and that controversy is possible as to the manner of understanding and qualifying the use of each particular case and its relation to the rule" (p. 359-360).

Since D'Souza writes the book as if his primary thesis and premises had already been established as fact, one finds that D'Souza begs several questions. As noted earlier, Whatley states that examples used as illustrations seek to clarify the claim rather than to prove it. This, of course, assumes that the claim has already been well-accepted. As noted earlier, D'Souza assumed the audience had already accepted the claims before reading the book or, at the very least, after reading the first chapter. He begs the question when he assumes that, as a rule:

> The middle ground seems to have disappeared as a consequence of ideological fracas and polarization . . . . For those who visit any American campus, peruse the student newspaper, enter the student union and talk with some of the undergraduates, or examine the lectures and workshops listed on the bulletin board, it is clear that the heavily publicized racial confrontations on campus are mere symptoms of much deeper changes that are rapidly under way, with far-reaching consequences for American society. (p. 2)

He also begs three more key questions: unfair and preferential admission policies are pervasive, universities have replaced the traditional curriculum with overtly ideological courses, and universities are engaging in widespread censorship of ideas which are contrary to the political ideals of campus liberals.

D'Souza's stated intent is clear: to dramatize the academic revolution and to give the public an inside look of the problems on American campuses. Despite his intent to merely illustrate the scope of the problem or, as Perelman might say, to create "presence," argument critics must recognize the book for what it is--an exercise in public argument, and approach it as such. As an argument from illustration, the book begs several key questions, which are never established as "fact," and as an argument from example, the book is logically unconvincing. As an exercise in public argument, perhaps D'Souza's Illiberal Education will remind some of us that it is the acceptance of distortions and adherence to the biases expressed by this book, rather than the "current revolution of minority victims," that

"threaten to destroy the highest ideals of liberal education, and with them that enlightenment and understanding which hold out the only prospects for racial harmony, social justice, and minority advancement" (p. 257).

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